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Mr . President , on March 23 , 1955 , sixteen
Senators joined with me in presenting to the Finance
Committee suggestions for three proposed amendments to
H. R. 1 , the Reciprocal Trade agreements Bill , and I
had previously appeared before the Committee on March 17
to present our reasons for seeking such changes in H. R. 1 .
My colleagues in ad?ocating these amendments
to the Committee , which we requested the Committee to adopt
as its own , were Senators Ervin , Sparkman , Hill , Purte J.l ,
Aiken , Pastore , Stennis , Scott , Green , Bridges , Cotton ,
Payne , Johnston (S . C. ) , Daniel , Smith (Me . ) , and Flanders.
I now ask for ~ unanimous consent to
insert in the body of the Record this statement and the
following information relating to this joint proposal
on behalf of my colleagues and myself.
The amendments:
1.

On page 4 , line 13; page 6 , line 20; page 6 , line

22; page 7, line 10; and page 10 , line 9:

Strike out the

word "July" and insert in lieu thereof the word "January ."
2.

On page 4, line 14;

Strike out line 14 through

line 25 on page 4 and line 1 through line 2 on page 5 and
renumber clause

3.

0

(iii)" on page 5, line 3 as "(ii)" .

On page 5, line 24:

Strike out the subparagraph

lettered " (E)" in its entirety .
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Basically, all three amendments are aimed at the same objective:
to make the bill what its proponents advertise it to be--a threeyear extension of the President 9 s authority to enter into trade
agreements, with new power to cut existing tariff rates by up to

5 percent during each of the next three years.

Actually, as

r:iassed by the House, H. 'R. 1 makes it possible to cut existing
tariff rates on cotton textiles by as much as 57h percent .

AMENDMENT NO . 1
The House bill sets July 1, 1955, as the base date for figuring
tariff reductions under its 15 nercent duty cutting authority .
But between now and that date, rates subject to change in the
current tariff negotiations at Geneva may be cut by amounts
ranging up to 50 nercent .

Some 90 percent of the cotton textile

industry 9 s nroduction is subject to possible tariff reductions
at Geneva of 50 percent .

No one knows what cotton textile tariff

rates will be on next July 1.

Other major industries are not

involved in the Geneva negotiations to a comparable extent and so
know what their tariffs will be on July 1 and hence can calculate
the effect of H. R. 1 on them .

Amendment No. 1 is designed to

correct this inequity by changing the base d3te from July 1,

1955

to Jnnuary 1, 1922.!.

AJ.VIENDMENT NO • 2
The provision in H.R. 1 authorizing the President, through trade
agreements, to cut by as much as 50 percent the tariff rates ef
January 1, 1945, on these items being imported not at all or in
n neg l'1g1'bl e n
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publicity has been given this section of the bill.

Under such

provision, for example , practically all textile tariff rates might
well fall •
.'vho is to determine whnt is a "n~gligible" quantity?

And even

if this provision is strictly interpreted by the administrators
of H.R. 1, is it not quite possible, nevertheless, that a cut of
50 percent in su~h rates will lead to a tenfold expahsion in

imports of the items involved?
Amendment No. 2 is designed to correct this inequity by
eliminating this provision from the bill .
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AMENDMENT NO.~
The general rule in H. R. 1 grants authority to reduce existing
duties by 15 percent (5 percent per year) but an excention is
made in sub-paragraph (E) of Section 3 (a).

It authorizes the

President on and after June 12, 1955, to reduce duties by 50
percent of those existing on January 1, 1945, on those articles
which are on the list of items being nGgotiated with Japan at
Geneva.
The principal industry now being negotiated at Geneva is the
textile industry and, by and large, the whole 50 per cent reduction
is avnilable.

It is unfair to segregate an industry which is

unfortunate enough to be currently on the bargaining table and
authorize a much greater cut in its duties than is allowed for
the rest of the American industry.
The exception goes even further, however, than merely discriminating in the amount of ~eductj_ons.

Sub-paragraph (E) contains

a different test to guide the President.

It grants authority to

reduce rates by 50 per cent "if the President determines that such
decrease is necessarv in order to provide expanding export markets
for products of Japan (including such markets in third countries)".
It is apparent that the test of Sub-paragraph (E( is designed
exclusively to aid Japan without reference to the welfare of our
domestic industry and hence is contrary to the general principles
of this legislation.

As a matter of statutory construction, the

snecific controls the general .

It is patently obvious that

decrenses in our duties would "provide expanding export markets
for the products of Japan~"

It can also be argued that this

special test in Sub-paragraph (E) nullifies both the "escape"
and "peril-point" provisions of the current Act and leaves the
textile industry exposed to great damage and unemployment.
Amendment no. 3 is designed to correct this inequity by
striking the provision from the bill.
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